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DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE: A
REAPPRAISAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PRIOR RESTRAINT
MARIN SCORDATOt
For nearly 60 years, the doctrine of prior restraint has held a cen-
tral position in first amendment jurisprudence. A law that acts as a
prior restraint on speech comes under such searching judicial scrutiny
that it almost always is invalidated. Professor Marin Scordato makes a
frontal attack on the existing prior restraint doctrine in this Article. ie
first maintains that the traditional definition ofprior restraint defies the
common-sense meaning of the term. Then he examines the policy justi-
fications for identifying prior restraints by their asserted tendency to pro-
duce constitutionally undesirable results compared with their
definitional opposites, subsequent sanctions. He asserts that these justifi-
cations lack logical coherence and, in some cases, constitutional rele-
vance. Professor Scordato suggests a redefinition of the doctrine that
would limit its application to literal prior restraints, such as the physical
seizure by the government of a speaker's medium of expression. He con-
cludes that a literal approach would correct the doctrine's logical flaws
and might spur the development of a more direct and relevant jurispru-
dence regarding the traditional prior restraints that would fall outside
his redefinition, namely judicial injunctions and licensing systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1931 release of the Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minne-
sota,1 the doctrine of prior restraint has been an essential element of first amend-
ment jurisprudence. On its face, the doctrine requires that any government
action which operates as a prior restraint on speech be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny. So strict is the scrutiny applied under the doctrine that the Supreme
Court has never upheld a law that it has characterized as a prior restraint on
pure speech. 2
Despite the frequency with which the doctrine of prior restraint is cited in
court opinions and the level of general recognition it has achieved, relevant case
law does not provide a concise and logically coherent definition of a prior re-
straint on speech. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the years since Near has
affixed the prior restraint label to an exceptionally diverse group of laws, regula-
tions, and government actions. Upon inspection, these laws, regulations, and
actions appear to have little in common other than the fact that the Court has
deemed them deserving of strict judicial scrutiny. 3 As a result, the term "prior
restraint" has become largely a legal misnomer, and the doctrine a source of
confusion and controversy. 4
1. 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see infra text accompanying notes 17-21.
2. In this context, pure speech refers to expression that is not inextricably part of some other-
wise problematic physical behavior. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493-96 (1975); Friedman,
Why Do You Speak That Way-Symbolic Expression Reconsidered, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587
(1988); Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV.
29 (1973).
Typically, Supreme Court decisions upholding regulations that potentially restrain symbolic
speech before it can be expressed characterize such regulations as time, place, or manner restrictions
rather than prior restraints. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (upholding conviction for burning
a draft card); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (upholding conviction for demonstra-
tion at county jail). The most recent example of this phenomenon is the Court's opinion in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989). In this case, the Court reviewed a Use Guideline
adopted by New York City that required those using a city bandshell in Central Park to use sound
amplification equipment and technicians provided by the city. Id. at 2754-60. In upholding the Use
Guideline, the majority concluded that, "[Ijt is valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable
regulation of the place and manner of expression." Id. at 2760. The dissent, by contrast, argued
that, "As a system of prior restraint, the Guidelines are presumptively invalid." Id. at 2763 (Mar-
shall, J. dissenting); see also infra note 103 (describing Court's treatment of symbolic and "mixed"
speech in other cases).
3. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 35. Perhaps because of the uncertainty that surrounds it, the doctrine of
prior restraint historically has been the focus of lively debate among legal scholars. See, e.g., Blasi,
inward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 648 (1955); Hunter, Toward a Better
Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
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The confusion associated with the doctrine of prior restraint results not
only from its inconsistent application by the courts but, more importantly, from
the incoherence that plagues the conceptual distinction at the root of the doc-
trine-the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent sanctions. The
third section of this Article argues that a coherent conceptual distinction be-
tween prior restraints and subsequent sanctions is not possible so long as courts
categorize as prior restraints laws that do not impose upon potential speakers a
legal sanction until the speaker has publicly communicated the offending speech.
This argument is based upon an appreciation of the fact that most positive laws
are valued by society primarily for their ability to create and maintain effective
prospective deterrents to societally disfavored behavior. From this perspective,
all such laws operate as prior restraints. This insight is particularly problematic
for the current doctrine of prior restraint because the vast majority of laws that
the Supreme Court has identified formally as prior restraints do not impose
upon potential speakers a legal sanction until the prohibited speech has been
expressed.5
Over the years, legal scholars have attempted to resolve this fundamental
problem, and thereby rationalize the prior restraint doctrine, by asserting that
those laws identified as prior restraints accurately can be characterized as: (1)
having a greater chilling effect on potential speech; 6 (2) subjecting a wider spec-
trum of speech to official scrutiny;7 (3) suppressing speech at significantly less
cost;8 and (4) encouraging greater speech suppression than laws in the form of
subsequent sanctions. 9 The fourth section of this Article demonstrates, using
systems of administrative preclearance and judicial injunctions as paradigm ex-
amples of prior restraints, that these assertions simply are not tenable. Close
examination of these prior restraints, especially when compared with classic and
popular subsequent sanctions such as defamation laws and "Son of Sam" stat-
utes,' 0 leads to the conclusion that neither systems of administrative
preclearance nor judicial injunctions necessarily will possess any of the above
undesirable attributes to any greater degree than speech-related laws in the form
of subsequent sanctions. In fact, substantial reasons exist for suspecting that just
the opposite might be the case.
Once it is established that the laws most frequently labeled by the United
States Supreme Court as prior restraints neither impose a legal sanction on
speakers until the offending speech already has been communicated nor possess
the asserted undesirable attributes of prior restraints to any greater degree than
do laws that traditionally have been classified as subsequent sanctions, then the
283 (1982); Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); Mayton, Toward a Theory
of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245 (1982); Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior
Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53 (1984).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 25-34.
6. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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modem doctrine of prior restraint is exposed as being fatally incoherent. At its
very best, the doctrine masks judicial attempts to disfavor laws possessing cer-
tain undesirable attributes behind a facial disapproval of prior restraints. The
fifth section of this Article describes and illustrates the problems inevitably asso-
ciated with such an approach.
The sixth section of this Article proposes that the legal definition of prior
restraint be revised to include only those government actions that result in the
physical interception and suppression of speech prior to its public expression.
This revision would base the prior restraint doctrine on a legal distinction be-
tween prior restraints and subsequent sanctions that is logically coherent and in
harmony with the common-sense meaning of these terms. As a result, the dis-
tinction upon which the doctrine is based will be more intuitive and easily un-
derstood, thus providing the kind of predictability of application that is essential
to the creation of an environment in which constitutionally protected speech can
flourish. Moreover, adoption of this version of the prior restraint doctrine may
encourage the development of new, more specific doctrines that deal directly,
and thus more effectively, with the first amendment problems posed by judicial
injunctions and systems of administrative preclearance of speech.
II. THE CURRENT VERSION OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
Any system of prior restraint. . . "comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." . . . The pre-
sumption against prior restraints is heavier-and the degree of protec-
tion broader-than that against limits on expression imposed by
criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in
our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of
speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others
beforehand. "
When the first amendment was approved by the First Congress, it
was undoubtedly intended to prevent government's imposition of any
system of prior restraints similar to the English licensing system under
which nothing could be printed without the approval of the state or
church authorities. 12
On one point adherents of all schools of thought appear to agree.
At a minimum the First Amendment was adopted to prevent the fed-
eral government-and later the state governments through the Four-
teenth Amendment-from instituting a general system of prior
restraint on speech or press similar to that employed in England and
the Colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, i.e., licensing
of the press and censorship of expression. 13
11. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)) (citations omitted).
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-34, at 1039 (2d ed. 1988).
13. H. ZUCKMAN, M. GAYNES, T.B. CARTER & J. DEE, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 28 (3d ed. 1988).
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The first of the above three quotations is taken from the United States
Supreme Court's decision in the case of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad. The second comes from the latest edition of Professor Laurence Tribe's
treatise on constitutional law. The third appears in a popular student guide on
mass communications law. Representing as they do three very different spheres
of legal literature, these quotations illustrate the current consensus with respect
to the prior restraint doctrine: that laws and other official actions having the
potential to suppress speech can be characterized as either a "prior restraint"
upon speech yet to be uttered or a "subsequent sanction" in response to previ-
ously uttered speech and that prior restraints are to be strongly disfavored rela-
tive to subsequent sanctions for the purpose of determining the constitutional
validity of such laws. Under current first amendment jurisprudence, prior re-
straints are so strongly disfavored that labeling a law as a prior restraint on
speech is tantamount to a declaration that the law is unconstitutional. 1 4
The distinction between laws that impose a prior restraint on speech and
those that constitute a subsequent sanction can be traced to the eighteenth cen-
tury.1 5 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone
wrote:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publica-
tions, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments
he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of
the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity. 16
In the United States, the first and most frequently cited case in prior re-
straint jurisprudence is Near v. Minnesota.1 7 In Near, decided in the summer of
1931, the Supreme Court confronted a judicial injunction prohibiting the contin-
ued publication of a vehemently anti-Semitic newspaper. A state district court
issued the injunction pursuant to a Minnesota statute that provided for the en-
joining as a public nuisance of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspa-
14. The United States Supreme Court never has found a prior restraint on pure speech to be
constitutional. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568-70 (1976); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
713, 721-23 (1931).
15. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19-20 (1941); L. LEVY, EMERGENCE
OF A FREE PRESS 12-13, 147, 169 (1985); F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND:
1476-1776 5, 392 (1952).
16. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52. It was Blackstone's view that prior re-
straints were the only unacceptable form of legal regulation of speech. It has been suggested, most
notably by Professor John Jeffries, that this English common-law tradition encouraged early Ameri-
can courts, including the Supreme Court, to characterize all constitutionally unacceptable forms of
speech regulation as prior restraints on speech. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 419-20. This tendency,
according to Professor Jeffries, exerted pressure on courts continually to expand the accepted mean-
ing of a prior restraint on speech. Id. ("We are left, therefore, with a doctrine of honored past but
contemporary irrelevance-a formulation whose current contribution to the interpretation of the
First Amendment is chiefly confusion.").
17. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For a more expansive discussion and critique of the Near case, see
Blasi, supra note 4, at 15-19. For a detailed account of the factual background in the case, see F.
FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG (1981).
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per, magazine or other periodical." 18 The Supreme Court of Minnesota had
affirmed the district court's judgment.19 In a five-to-four decision, the United
States Supreme Court held both the injunction and the statute to be prior re-
straints on speech in violation of the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. Citing Blackstone as historical precedent, 20 the Near Court formally
introduced into American case law the concept of prior restraint as a separate
and significant category of first amendment analysis. According to the Court:
The question is whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in
restraint of publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty
of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed. In determining
the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to
prevent previous restraints upon publication. 2'
The Supreme Court consistently has reaffirmed the importance of prior re-
straint in the resolution of first amendment issues in a variety of cases since
Near.22 Reviewing these cases in 1976, the Court wrote:
The Court has interpreted these [first amendment] guarantees to afford
special protection against orders that prohibit the publication or
broadcast of particular information or commentary-orders that im-
pose a "previous" or "prior" restraint on speech.
The thread running through all these cases is that prior restraints
on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights. 23
Given this characterization of prior restraints, one might expect that special
care would have been devoted to developing a formal definition of a prior re-
straint on speech. Nonetheless, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal
courts thus far have developed such a definition. 24 Without an explicit judicial
definition of a prior restraint, one naturally looks for an implicit definition in the
pattern of court decisions in the area. In the cases decided since Near, however,
the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of prior restraint to a broad array of
government activities. These various activities include: judicial injunctions; 25
18. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02 (quoting Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 Minn. Laws 358).
19. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, decision on certified question, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770
(1928), decision on appeal of final judgment, 179 Minn. 40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929), rev'd sub norn.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
20. Near, 283 U.S. at 713-14 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52).
21. Id. at 713.
22. See infra cases cited in notes 25-34 and accompanying text; see also Note, RICO Forfeiture
and Obscenity: Prior Restraint or Subsequent Punishment?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1112 n.79
(1988) ("Since Near, the Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed and refined the prior restraint
doctrine.").
23. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 4-27 U.S. 539, 556, 559 (1976).
24. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 420 ("The lack of settled content in the term 'prior restraint' is,
by now, painfully obvious, and might well be glossed over were it not for the surprising persistence of
assumptions to the contrary.").
25. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (per curiam); Ne-
braska Presrs0s',n 427 U.S. at 570; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(per curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971).
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systems of administrative preclearance that require a government license or per-
mit prior to publication;2 6 a state tax on the gross receipts of newspapers having
greater than a specified circulation;2 7 a use tax on the cost of paper and ink
products required for newspaper publication;28 a license fee applied to vendors
of religious literature;2 9 the refusal by a city to rent its municipal theater for a
production of "Hair"; 30 a statute prohibiting the publication of the names of
juvenile offenders without the permission of the juvenile court;31 a zoning ordi-
nance limiting the geographic concentration of theaters showing X-rated films; 32
the creation of a commission whose primary purpose was to identify for the
public, and for government prosecutors, books and magazines having the ten-
dency to corrupt the morals of youth;33 and a city ordinance granting the mayor
authority to approve or deny applications for annual permits to place newspaper
vending machines on public property. 34
It is difficult to identify any pattern or common characteristics shared by
these formally recognized prior restraints, especially so since none involve sup-
pression of speech prior to its expression. In fact, so many types of government
activities have at one time or another been characterized as a prior restraint on
speech that few courts or commentators have even attempted to develop a de-
scriptive theory of the courts' activity in this area. Indeed, some legal scholars
have acknowledged openly the conceptual confusion that currently plagues the
doctrine.35 For all this, the doctrine of prior restraint continues to thrive and to
26. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 159 (1969); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 273 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938).
27. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 350-51 (1936).
28. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93
(1983).
29. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573,
577-78 (1944).
30. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 564 (1975).
31. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979).
32. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976).
33. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963).
34. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2152 (1988).
35. In the most recent edition of his treatise on constitutional law, Professor Laurence Tribe
writes:
Indeed, the doctrine has been used to invalidate such a variety of restrictions on speech,
under such a wide range of conditions, that some scholars have questioned the conceptual
clarity of the term. There is much to this criticism, for the Court has often used the cry of
"prior restraints" not as an independent analytical framework but rather to signal conclu-
sions that it has reached on other grounds.
L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 12-34, at 1040; see also Jeffries, supra note 4, at 419-20 (The doctrine of
prior restraint "purports to assess the constitutionality of government action by distinguishing prior
restraint from subsequent punishment, but provides no coherent basis for making that categoriza-
tion.... The lack of settled content in the term 'prior restraint' is, by now, painfully obvious .... );
Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term-A Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 3, 32 (1971) ("it is not altogether clear just what a prior restraint is or just what is the matter
with it"); Redish, supra note 4, at 53-54 ("Although the prior restraint doctrine pervades Supreme
Court rhetoric, the Court's decisions reveal inconsistencies in the doctrine's application .... These
apparent doctrinal ambiguities and inconsistencies result from the absence of any detailed judicial
analysis of the true rationale behind the prior restraint doctrine."). But see Blasi, supra note 4, at 93
("The concept of prior restraint is coherent at the core.").
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exert its influenceon the resolution of contemporary first amendment issues.3 6
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT VERSION
OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
The fundamental problem with the contemporary doctrine of prior restraint
is that the distinction upon which the doctrine rests-the distinction between
prior restraints and subsequent sanctions-lacks sufficient substance to support
a categorical legal rule. The distinction, as developed thus far, fails to provide a
means of identifying a category of potentially speech-suppressive government
activities that is in any way meaningful for first amendment purposes. As a
result, the prior restraint doctrine lacks the reliability and predictability of appli-
cation necessary to support constitutionally protected speech. It is, in effect, a
distinction without a difference.
Consider, for example, the definition of a prior restraint offered by Profes-
sor Thomas Emerson in his now classic 1955 article: "The concept of prior
restraint, roughly speaking, deals with official restrictions imposed upon speech
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication." 37 The definition
offered by Professors Rotunda, Nowak, and Young in their treatise on constitu-
tional law is similar: "[A]ny governmental order which restricts or prohibits
speech prior to its publication constitutes a prior restraint."' 38
The essential problem with these definitions is that once the interpretation
of terms like "restraint," "restrict," or "prohibit" moves beyond the strictly lit-
eral, 39 the definition loses the power to exclude most positive laws from its
scope. It therefore loses its ability to serve as the basis for a meaningful doctri-
nal distinction. This is the case because nearly all laws, by their nature and
purpose, are designed to influence human behavior prior to its actual occur-
rence. Since the general decline in the acceptance of the concept of natural law,
positive laws and regulations have been rationalized primarily on the basis of
their ability to reduce the future occurrence of societally disfavored behavior.40
36. Hardly a Supreme Court term goes by without at least one or two cases being decided on
the basis of the prior restraint doctrine. In the 1988-89 term, the Court decided Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989) (discussed supra note 2) and Fort Wayne Books v.
Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989) (pretrial seizure of expressive materials beyond that required for
evidentiary purposes without a determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing held to be
invalid as posing an unacceptable risk of prior restraint).
Important prior restraint cases now working their way through the lower courts include New
Era Publications Int'l, APS v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), 57 U.S.L.W.
2178 (Sept. 27, 1988), and Insurance Adjustment Bureau v. Pennsylvania Ins. Comm'r., 518 Pa. 210,
542 A.2d 1317 (1988), 56 U.S.L.W. 1185 (June 7, 1988).
37. Emerson, supra note 4, at 648.
38. 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SU-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.16, at 72 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. ROTUNDA]. Given the histor-
ical significance of the concept, Supreme Court case law is remarkable for its lack of a general
definition of prior restraints on speech. The two definitions offered here accurately enunciate the
meaning most often ascribed to the use of the phrase "prior restraint" by the courts.
39. Strictly literal, as used here, means the physical suppression of speech prior to its expres-
sion. See infra text accompanying notes 101-08.
40. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, 13-33, 40-42 (1965); H.
KI'I.SItN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW Ch.l, 1-54 (M. Knight transl. 1970).
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After-the-act sanctions are employed in the law largely to restrain members of
the regulated community from engaging in that act again in the future.4 1 In a
world in which laws are viewed primarily from this instrumentalist perspective,
society views virtually all laws as prior restraints on behavior. Thus from this
perspective it is clear that a substantive distinction cannot logically be main-
tained between some laws that operate as prior restraints on speech and others
that operate as subsequent sanctions when in fact all of the laws in question do
not impose upon potential speakers a legal sanction until the speaker actually
has communicated the offending speech. 42
IV. THE CONVENTIONAL EVASION OF THE PROBLEM: A REEXAMINATION
OF THE ASSERTED ATTRIBUTES OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
Given the inconsistency inherent in the current distinction between prior
restraints and subsequent sanctions, it is difficult to understand how the doctrine
of prior restraint has survived intact for so long. Perhaps it has survived because
it is perceived as a speech-protective doctrine in a period characterized by ex-
panded protection of speech by the courts.4 3 Perhaps it has provided a useful
means to facially resolve cases which involve free speech issues that the courts
have not wished to confront directly. 44
Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that one crucial element in the survival
of the prior restraint doctrine has been the willingness of many courts, and many
commentators, to finesse the definitional inconsistency embedded in the modem
41. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
165-66 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970); E. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISH-
MENT 17-25 (1966); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 3-13 (1955).
42. According to one commentator,
The standard mechanism for a licensing system is a criminal prosecution for speaking with-
out the required permit .... Persons who violate permit requirements are sanctioned only
if a district attorney determines that prosecution is warranted in light of the seriousness of
the offense and competing pressures on the criminal docket.
Blasi, supra note 4, at 23-24. In discussing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963),
Professor Mayton noted further:
The majority in Bantam Books viewed the administrative licensing process in the usual
way, without following the process to its end-where we find subsequent punishment. A
tendency is to view a bureaucratic licensing scheme as "self-effectuating." As Harlan's
dissent indicates, we ignore the subsequent punishment basis of a licensing scheme.
Mayton, supra note 4, at 264.
43. See Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1205, 1345-55 (1983); see also Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L.
REV. 191, 196 (1958) ("Virtually all of the law of free speech, assembly and press ... has been
articulated in the last forty years."); Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1, 5 (1986) ("Until World War I the first amendment was not a significant source of
justiciable rights. Indeed, it was narrowly construed until the 1940's and, some would say, until the
1960's."); Comment, A Sign of the Times: Billboard Regulation and the First Amendment, 15 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 635, 647 (1984) ("As the scope of the first amendment review has been expanded to
embrace state, as well as federal regulation of speech, the topics of protected speech have similarly
been extended beyond the subject of political debate. Further, first amendment speech principles
have been applied to various mediums of expression, apart from the spoken word." (footnote omit-
ted)); Garneau, Friends of the First Amendment, EDITOR & PUBLISHER 9 (July 1, 1989) ("The
Supremes have been busy lately making free speech freer.").
44. The clearest example of the prior restraint doctrine being used in this fashion is The Penta-
gon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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version of the prior restraint/subsequent sanction distinction. This finesse is
usually accomplished through a two-step strategy. The first step begins by as-
serting that laws traditionally labeled as prior restraints 45 share one or more
constitutionally undesirable characteristics and that the presence of these char-
acteristics justify subjecting the laws to especially strict judicial scrutiny. The
second step of the analysis solves the definitional problem by asserting that all
laws possessing the identified undesirable characteristics are, as a result, prior
restraints. 46 One reason that this finesse has been so effective is that once a law
is determined to be a prior restraint by virtue of possessing certain constitution-
ally undesirable characteristics, then it is a relatively easy matter to justify the
larger legal doctrine mandating that all prior restraints be subject to strict, and
usually fatal, judicial scrutiny.
Despite the practical success this definitional strategy has enjoyed, it pos-
sesses two serious flaws. The first involves the questionable nature of its major
premise, that the undesirable attributes used to define the prior restraint cate-
gory are in fact characteristic of those laws that traditionally have been labeled
as prior restraints. The second flaw, following from the first, is that the prior
restraint/subsequent sanction distinction, as currently defined, is almost per-
versely counterintuitive. It uses a category label that possesses a common-sense
meaning in our language and yet defines the population of the category without
reference to the common-sense meaning of that label. By adopting this distinc-
tion as its substantive base, the doctrine of prior restraint becomes little more
than a label attached to a legal conclusion already reached; a veil behind which
independent, and frequently unnamed, factors are considered and weighed. The
result is a doctrine profoundly misleading and ripe for misuse.
The first step in the current definitional approach to the doctrine of prior
restraint is the identification of certain undesirable attributes alleged to be char-
acteristic of prior restraints. These identified attributes generally gravitate to-
ward one of two major themes. The first theme involves asserted differences in
the effect that prior restraints and subsequent sanctions have on potential
speech. The second theme involves asserted differences in the procedural struc-
ture and the expected implementation of prior restraints compared with subse-
quent sanctions.
For the purpose of analyzing these asserted attributes, this section will fo-
cus on two kinds of government action that consistently have been characterized
by courts as prior restraints: (1) judicial injunctions prospectively prohibiting
speech; and (2) regulatory schemes involving the administrative preclearance of
speech, such as licensing laws. These two types of government action have been
45. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. According to one commentator,
The best of these efforts [to define what constitutes a prior restraint] look at the problem in
reverse-that is, they begin with the functional consequence of finding a prior restraint and
then seek to identify characteristics that justify that result. In other words, the scholarship
seeks a functional reconstruction of prior restraint in terms that link the definition of the
category with the rationale for creating a rule of independent constitutional disfavor.
Jeffries, supra note 4, at 420-21.
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cited so frequently as illustrative examples that they have become virtual para-
digms of prior restraint. 47 As a result, they can serve as examples against which
to analyze the accuracy of the claim that laws traditionally characterized as
prior restraints share certain undesirable characteristics.
A. The Chilling Effect of Prior Restraints
The first theme around which the asserted attributes of prior restraints clus-
ter involves alleged differences in the effect that prior restraints and subsequent
sanctions have on potential speech. The thrust of this argument is set forth
succinctly in the Supreme Court's opinion in Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art: "If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." 48 Professors Ro-
tunda, Nowak, and Young's treatise on constitutional law is one of many secon-
dary sources that embraces, and more explicitly articulates, this same basic
point: "[T]he 'marketplace' theory of speech supports the distinction between
prior restraint and subsequent punishment. While subsequent punishment may
deter some speakers, at least the ideas or speech at issue can be placed before the
47. According to Blasi,
[T]he issue introduced by Near [is] should the injunction, as a general matter, be regarded
as a particularly repressive method of regulating speech, akin to the historically disfavored
administrative licensing system? The question is of importance in first amendment theory
because the modem doctrine of prior restraint would be thrown into disarray should one of
its two central props be removed.
Blasi, supra note 4, at 14. As Jeffries explains further,
Near has come to stand for a sort of syllogism about injunctive relief: Prior restraint of
speech is presumptively unconstitutional, even where the speech in question is not other-
wise protected. An injunction is a prior restraint. Therefore, an injunction against speech
is presumptively unconstitutional, even where the speech enjoined is not otherwise
protected.
Jeffries, supra note 4, at 417. See also Emerson, supra note 4, at 655 ("The clearest form of prior
restraint arises in those situations where the government limitation, expressed in statute, regulation,
or otherwise, undertakes to prevent future publication or other communication without advance
approval of an executive official.").
Some legal scholars have attempted to distinguish judicial injunctions from systems of adminis-
trative preclearance and thereby to rescue judicial injunctions from the operational scope of the prior
restraint doctrine. 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 69-74 (1978); Barnett, The Puzzle of
Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 544-45 (1977); Jeffries, supra note 4, at 426-34, 433 ("In my
view, a rule of special hostility to administrative preclearance is fully justified, but a rule of special
hostility to injunctive relief is not."); Mayton, supra note 4, at 249-53, 246 ("A purpose of this
Article is to show that the preference for subsequent punishment over injunctive relief diminishes the
exercise of free speech by burdening it with costs that seem not yet comprehended.").
The strategy generally employed by these writers is to argue that many, if not most, of the ills
traditionally associated with prior restraints are not applicable to judicial injunctions. Despite these
efforts, the Supreme Court has not altered its view that judicial injunctions against speech are prior
restraints as it initially announced in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931), and has
continued to maintain in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977) (per
curiam); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); and Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 418 (1971).
48. 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (paraphrasing A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61
(1975)). In this case, the Supreme Court characterized as a prior restraint, and thereby reversed as
being constitutionally invalid, a court order initially issued by a Nebraska state court, and subse-
quently modified by the Nebraska Supreme Court, that restrained the media from publishing poten-
tially prejudicial pretrial material in a criminal trial in which the defendant was accused of
committing six highly publicized murders. Id. at 570.
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public. Prior restraint limits public debate and knowledge more severely."'49
The basic argument, echoed in the lower courts and by many commentators, is
that prior restraints pose a greater practical deterrent to constitutionally pro-
tected speech than do subsequent sanctions. 50
For the purpose of examining this argument, suppose that the deterrent
effect of a particular law or regulation can be expressed in the abstract as a
function of the regulated community's perception of the negative value of the
sanction imposed in response to a violation of the law discounted by the per-
ceived probability that the sanction will in fact be imposed in response to a given
violation. 5' Under this model, a law, or other government action, can influence
the likelihood that a given behavior will occur by altering the regulated commu-
nity's perception of either the unattractiveness of the sanction or the likelihood
that the sanction will be imposed in response to a given occurrence of the disfa-
vored behavior. It therefore follows that in order to claim successfully that prior
restraints result in greater overall suppression of speech than do subsequent
sanctions, it is necessary to establish that prior restraints have a systematically
different impact on either the perceived unattractiveness of the threatened sanc-
tion or on the perceived probability that the threatened sanction will be invoked
in response to a given violation of the law.52
With respect to the first factor in this calculation, there is no apparent logi-
49. 3 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 38, § 20.16, at 68.
50. See Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365, 1371 (4th Cir. 1982) (Phillips, J. dissent-
ing); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 469 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89
(1981); United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1512 (E.D. Va. 1987); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas
Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 916, 934-35 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848
F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1988); Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 239 n.3,
375 P.2d 719, 725 n.3 (1962) (en banc). One commentator states the argument as follows:
[P]rior restraints, from whatever source and through whatever process, all curtail speech
before it happens .... On the other hand, a system of subsequent punishment, properly
limited, may have an inhibitory effect, but a speaker can proceed to speak if he is willing to
risk possible prosecution. Simply stated, there is a world of difference between a govern-
ment statement that one cannot speak at all and a statement that one can speak out at some
risk of paying a specified cost.
Hunter, supra note 4, at 293; see also Blasi, supra note 4, at 25 ("It is a sign of the times that all the
leading writers on prior restraint in the last decade-Bickel, Fiss, Barnett, Kalven, Litwack, Mur-
phy, Schauer-have treated the self-censorship phenomenon as either the exclusive or the central
consideration in deciding whether prior restraints should be disfavored.").
51. While this description of the probable deterrent effect of a given law clearly is not exhaus-
tive (it excludes, for example, any consideration of the range of behavioral alternatives available to a
potential actor), it adequately serves to demonstrate the problematic nature of asserting that a pre-
dictable and systematic chilling effect corresponds to the prior restraint/subsequent sanction distinc-
tion. For a more sophisticated attempt at model construction in this area, see Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 689-94 (1978).
52. This conclusion, and the model upon which it is based, implicitly assumes that the deterrent
effect of a given law is almost exclusively a function of the fact that a breach of that law may result in
the imposition of a legal sanction. There will, of course, be some percentage of cases in which people
obey the law not so much as a result of a conscious strategy for avoiding legal sanction, but simply
because it is the law. In such cases, people are likely to obey the law irrespective of the strength of
the sanction threatened or the likelihood of its imposition. While it is true that the proposed model
does not adequately account for cases of compliance that are not sanction-sensitive, this defect is
only important for the purposes of the instant analysis to the extent that laws that have been tradi-
tionally characterized as prior restraints are thought to have a greater deterrent effect in this class of
cases than do speech-restrictive laws not labeled prior restraints.
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cal or practically necessary correlation between the severity of the sanction im-
posed in response to a violation of the law and the law's status as either a prior
restraint or a subsequent sanction. 53 In other words, there is no reason why
laws classified as prior restraints should consistently impose upon violators more
severe sanctions than all other laws. For example, speakers found liable for def-
amation, unquestionably a subsequent sanction, often have faced judgments in
the multimillion and multihundred thousand dollar range.54 While no hard em-
pirical evidence is available, it is difficult to imagine that sanctions imposed in
response to the violation of speech-related injunctions ever reach such levels. In
fact, instead of prior restraints consistently carrying with them more severe
sanctions, the opposite may be true. As Professor Vincent Blasi has observed,
"[S]anctions for the violation of injunctions and permit ordinances tend to be
light in comparison with those commonly administered under the subsequent
punishment regimes." '55
It is a bit more difficult to evaluate the second factor in the calculation,
whether prior restraints systematically influence the perceived probability of a
53. See Blasi, supra note 4, at 26-27 ("Except in the area of defamation, and there only in one
limited respect, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to erect constitutional limitations on how
severely persons can be sanctioned for engaging in unprotected expression.").
54. The latest example of a multimillion dollar defamation judgment is the $100 million
awarded to GTE Corporation by a Florida jury in a trade libel action against Home Shopping Net-
work, Inc. in August of 1989. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at DI, col. 6; 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) No.
28, News Notes (Aug. 15 1989). Another example is Wayne Newton's acceptance of $5,275,000 in
his libel action against NBC, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, News Notes (Jan. 31, 1989), 56
U.S.L.W. 2347 (Dec. 22, 1987), reduced from an original jury award of $19,200,000, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 18, 1986, at A26, col. 1. Other eight-figure jury awards in defamation cases in the 1980s
include: Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) ($40,000,000, subsequently
remitted to $10,000,000), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d
438 (10th Cir. 1982) ($25,025,000), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Guccione v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., Slip op. No. 80AP-375 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1981) (noted in Guccione v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 313, 316 (1986), rev'd, 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1091 (1987)) ($40,300,000, subsequently remitted to $5,150,000), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).
Though eight-figure defamation awards are much more the exception than the rule, the Libel
Defense Resource Center has found that the average initial damage award in defamation cases de-
cided between 1984 and 1986 was $1,167,189. This compares with an average initial damage award
of $2,033,367 in defamation cases decided between 1982 and 1984 and $2,051,178 in cases decided
between 1980 and 1982. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, LITIGATION STUDY No. 9, DEFA-
MATION TRIALS, DAMAGE AWARDS AND APPEALS III: Two-YEAR UPDATE (1984-1986) 21, ex-
cerpted from Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin No. 21 (Oct. 31, 1987); see also LIBEL
DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER DAMAGES STUDY No. 1 (originally published in Libel Defense Re-
source Center Bulletin No. 4, 2-17 (Oct. 15, 1982)); LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER DAMAGES
STUDY No. 2 (originally published in Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin No. 11 1-34 (Aug. 15,
1984)).
In addition to the actual jury awards returned in these cases, speakers face the prospect of
spending large sums of money to defend themselves against defamation suits. For example, pub-
lished estimates of the cost of defending General William Westmoreland's libel suit against CBS go
as high as $8,000,000, and estimates of the cost of defending Ariel Sharon's libel suit against Time,
Inc. go as high as $7,000,000. Baer, Insurers to Libel Defense Counsel: "The Party's Over", AM.
LAW., Nov. 1985, at 69. One congressman (Rep. Charles Schumer, D-NY) has estimated that on
average a libel suit costs $150,000 to defend. Id.; see generally THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON
PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY STUDIES OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, PROPOSAL
FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW: THE REPORT OF THE LIBEL REFORM PROJECT 9 (1988) ("Libel
suits tend to be enormously expensive for defendants, often costing them hundreds of thousands or
millions of dollars.").
55. Blasi, supra note 4, at 27.
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legal sanction being imposed in response to a violation of the law. In the latest
edition of his treatise on constitutional law, Professor Laurence Tribe writes:
[I]t might well remain the case that prepublication restraints, espe-
cially those affirmatively singling out the would-be disseminator,
would deter far more protected conduct than criminal statutes ordina-
rily would. The latter is essentially a mute, impersonal threat; being
told personally not to publish is apt to cause more second thoughts-
no matter what defenses are ultimately available.5 6
Professor Tribe apparently is suggesting that threats of legal sanction that are
specific and personal in nature create stronger deterrents with respect to the
targeted behavior than do more passive and impersonal threats. The conclusion
he wishes to draw from this suggestion is that traditional prior restraints, such as
judicial injunctions and denials of license applications, cause members of the
regulated community to perceive the probability of eventual imposition of the
threatened legal sanction as significantly higher than in the case of similar laws
in the form of subsequent sanctions.
At least two points are worth noting in response to Professor Tribe's sug-
gestion. The first is a matter of perspective. While it may be true that the deter-
rent effect on any given individual in the regulated community will differ
depending on whether that individual is subject to specific, personal threats
rather than uniform, impersonal ones, it does not follow necessarily that general
use of the former in place of the latter would, on the whole, result in a larger net
deterrent effect throughout the regulated community. This is the case because
uniform, impersonal threats, while they may have less of a deterrent effect on
any given individual, will have some influence on every individual in the regu-
lated community. On the other hand, specific, personal threats, while perhaps
more potent with respect to each targeted individual, are limited in their scope,
by definition, to one, or at the most to a very few, such individuals. The overall
societal impact of such specific, personal threats, given the large number of indi-
viduals in society, is quite small indeed. 57
One response to this argument might be that particular instances of a spe-
cific, personal threat, if publicized sufficiently, could serve as admonitory exam-
ples and thus be responsible for an overall societal deterrent much greater than
56. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-35, at 1042 n.2. Professor Tribe is here referring to a much
more elaborate analysis of this point developed by Professor Vincent Blasi. See Blasi, supra note 4, at
35-36 ("This difference [in the degree of personalization present in prior restraints and subsequent
sanctions] may go far to explain why the prior forms of regulation are commonly thought to cause
more self-censorship than the subsequent punishment regimes."). Professor Blasi ultimately con-
cludes that the possible consequences of such personalization are not an important source of what he
terms "self-censorship" with respect to either judicial injunctions or systems of administrative
preclearance. Id. at 35-43.
57. A logical extension of this line of reasoning could lead to the conclusion, recognized by
some commentators in this area, that a system of speech regulation consisting exclusively ofjudicial
injunctions and systems of administrative preclearance would be, on the whole, less speech restric-
tive than a similar system composed exclusively of laws employing subsequent sanctions. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-34, at 1041 n.16; Blasi, supra note 4, at 26; cf. Mayton, supra note 4, at
281 ("Because injunctions are necessarily the product of a judicial process, they should be preferred
to subsequent punishment. This, of course, reverses the hierarchy of process established by the
present prior restraint doctrine.").
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one might otherwise predict. The problem with this response is that the same
logic could be applied as easily and accurately to prosecutions of individual vio-
lations of a law involving a uniform and impersonal subsequent sanction. Taken
as a whole, therefore, there appears to exist no persuasive reason to believe that
prior restraints, when viewed from an overall societal perspective, will alter the
regulated community's perception of the likelihood of a legal sanction being im-
posed in response to the utterance of prohibited speech to any greater degree
than will laws using subsequent sanctions.
In evaluating the relative strength and acceptability of deterrents likely to
be produced by either prior restraints or subsequent sanctions, it is important to
keep in mind that the kind of deterrents that are socially undesirable are those
that discourage constitutionally protected speech. Political ideology aside, there
is no reason formally to disfavor effective deterrents against speech deemed con-
stitutionally unprotected by the courts. Therefore, even if one could establish
convincingly that prior restraints generate more potent deterrents to speech than
do subsequent sanctions, this point would have little constitutional relevance
unless one also could establish that these more potent deterrents extend beyond
the boundaries of unprotected speech into the realm of constitutionally pro-
tected speech.
Given the fact, as noted by Professor Tribe, that prior restraints tend to be
more personalized and situation specific in nature than do subsequent sanc-
tions,5 8 one might reasonably assume that deterrents generated by legal regula-
tion in the form of prior restraints would be more carefully tailored and
specifically focused than deterrents generated by laws in the form of subsequent
sanctions. Consequently, prior restraints as a class would be less likely to extend
their reach into the domain of constitutionally protected speech than would sub-
sequent sanctions.59 From this perspective, then, it might appear that the cur-
rent doctrine of prior restraint has it exactly backward. Subsequent sanctions,
being more uniform and impersonal in nature than prior restraints, would ap-
pear to pose a significantly greater risk of deterring constitutionally protected
speech. Thus subsequent sanctions should be disfavored more vigorously than
prior restraints as a form of speech regulation.
As the preceding analysis indicates, there is little support for the notion that
traditional prior restraints are associated with more severe punishment than are
subsequent sanctions. Similarly, there is little reason to think that the commu-
nity as a whole will perceive the possibility of a legal sanction actually being
imposed as being systematically greater in the case of prior restraints than in the
case of subsequent sanctions. Moreover, there is good reason to suspect that
subsequent sanctions will generate a chilling effect that reaches substantially
more constitutionally protected speech than will laws in the form of prior re-
straints. Taken as a whole, this analysis strongly suggests that laws traditionally
58. See supra text accompanying note 56.
59. The same observation suggests that prior restraints are significantly less likely than laws
using subsequent sanctions to run afoul of the overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness doctrines. See
R. ROTUNDA, supra note 38, §§ 20.8-20.9, at 24-37.
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characterized as prior restraints are no more likely to produce a greater or more
effective chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech than laws tradition-
ally characterized as subsequent sanctions.
B. The Operational Attributes of Prior Restraints
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, both case law and scholarly litera-
ture present a number of arguments identifying attributes of traditional prior
restraints that allegedly cause the implementation of such laws to extend their
reach, and thus their deterrent effect, beyond the realm of constitutionally un-
protected speech. These arguments typically focus on the operational character-
istics of prior restraints, reflecting the second of the two general themes that
characterize attempts to rationalize the current distinction between prior re-
straints and subsequent sanctions. Because the majority of these arguments
have focused on systems of administrative preclearance and licensing, 60 they will
be examined in this context.
The major arguments advanced in this area are:
(1) systems of administrative review and licensing are capable of sub-
jecting a wider spectrum of speech to official scrutiny than are laws in
the form of subsequent sanctions; 61
(2) decisions to suppress speech are more easily made in the context of
administrative review and licensing systems;62 and
(3) administrative review and licensing systems both attract and re-
ward persons who are disposed more favorably to speech suppression
than the average citizen. 63
1. Breadth of Coverage
"The administrative apparatus erected to effect preclearance may screen a
range of expression far broader than that which otherwise would be brought to
official attention. ' 64
If taken literally, this argument asserts that it is possible to design systems
of administrative preclearance and licensing that subject more speech to legal
sanctions than do some laws in the form of subsequent sanctions. This seems
clearly true. This interpretation, however, leaves open the prospect that laws
may be designed in the form of subsequent sanctions that could screen a much
broader range of expression than would carefully tailored systems of administra-
60. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 421-26; Mayton, supra note 4, at 249-53.
Systems of administrative preclearance of speech, usually in the form of licensing requirements,
have a long and relatively well-documented history in both England and the United States. See L.
LEVY, supra note 15, at 6-7; F. SIEBERT, supra note 15, at 6-12.
61. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
64. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 422; see also Blasi, supra note 4, at 22 ("A licensing system is
objectionable in part because it subjects a wide range of expression to scrutiny .... "); Emerson,
supra note 4, at 656 ("A system of prior restraint normally brings within the complex of government
machinery a far greater amount of communication than a system of subsequent punishment.").
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tive preclearance. Since the logic of the argument leaves both of these possibili-
ties equally open, it provides no basis upon which formally to favor either prior
restraints or subsequent sanctions as a form of speech regulation.
Viewed in another light, the above passage could be interpreted as asserting
that systems of administrative review and licensing in general will be designed to
screen more speech than will laws in the form of subsequent sanctions. Without
supporting evidence, however, this assertion is little more than subjective conjec-
ture. Why should systems of administrative preclearance be designed to screen
more speech than currently is screened by subsequent sanctions? Would it be
practically possible to design a system of administrative preclearance that effec-
tively could screen more speech than currently is screened by subsequent
sanctions?
In answering these questions it is important to remember that there cur-
rently exist laws in the form of subsequent sanctions, such as defamation and
privacy torts, that make all speech subject to possible legal action and review.
All speech is potentially subject to civil action based on defamation, false light
invasion of privacy, public disclosure of private facts and appropriation. 65 Not
all speech will satisfy the requisite elements of these torts and thus generate legal
liability for the speaker, but all speech will be "screened" in the sense that it has
the potential to generate legal liability for the speaker should the requisite ele-
ments be present. It is difficult to imagine a workable system of administrative
preclearance that could possibly require official licensing of a similarly broad
spectrum of speech. This suggests that the conjecture upon which the above
argument is based is not only questionable, but very likely false.
Another important aspect of the larger analysis worth noting again in this
context is the issue of constitutional relevance. Even if it could be shown that
systems of administrative review are likely to be designed to screen more speech
than will laws utilizing subsequent sanctions, this fact would be relevant for first
amendment purposes only if it could also be shown that such systems are, as a
result, likely to screen more constitutionally protected speech.
In considering this issue, one could argue plausibly that systems of adminis-
trative preclearance, irrespective of their scope, are much less likely to impose
legal burdens on constitutionally protected speech than are laws in the form of
subsequent sanctions. This argument is based on the recognition that laws in the
form of subsequent sanctions that provide for the possibility of civil liability as a
result of speech, such as defamation and privacy torts, allocate the power to
initiate legal proceedings to the personally aggrieved subjects of the targeted
speech. These are the very persons most likely to become aware of the speech in
question and who are the most emotionally affected. Thus this group will be
highly motivated to seek the imposition of all possible legal sanctions against the
speaker. As between the aggrieved subject of the speech and a relatively imper-
sonal government employee, it is not at all clear that more speech would be
screened, in the aggregate, by a group of the latter than by a society full of the
65. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 111-18, at 771-869 (5th ed. 1984).
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former. Nor is it clear that more constitutional mistakes, such as the legal pros-
ecution of speech eventually found to be constitutionally protected, would be
made by the latter than by the former. In fact, intuition suggests just the
opposite.
In summary, the argument that systems of administrative review and li-
censing should be constitutionally disfavored because they are capable of sub-
jecting a wider spectrum of speech to official scrutiny should be rejected. The
argument ultimately rests upon an assertion that is either trivial in nature or
likely false. Moreover, even if true, the argument carries little constitutional
significance unless it also can be established that systems of administrative re-
view and licensing are more likely than other laws to disfavor constitutionally
protected speech. As the preceding argument has shown, however, there are rea-
sons to believe that just the opposite is the case.
2 Ease of Suppression
A government official thinks longer and harder before deciding to
undertake the serious task of subsequent punishment-the expenditure
of time, funds, energy, and personnel that will be necessary. Under a
system of prior restraints, he can reach the result by a simple stroke of
the pen .... For these and similar reasons, a decision to suppress in
advance is usually more readily reached, on the same facts, than a de-
cision to punish after the event. 66
The thrust of this argument is that under a system of administrative
preclearance, regulation of speech can be accomplished at far less cost to the
government than it can under laws using subsequent sanctions. Much like the
argument considered under the preceding section on Breadth of Coverage, the
passage quoted above implicitly adopts as its analytical model the worst possible,
and least likely, version of a system of administrative preclearance, asserting as it
does that suppression of speech can be accomplished by a government official
operating in a system of administrative preclearance "by a simple stroke of the
pen. ' '67
For this argument to provide serious support to the prior restraint doctrine,
which subjects all instances of administrative preclearance to exceptionally strict
judicial scrutiny, it should be necessary to establish that nearly all practicable
systems of administrative preclearance allow effective suppression of speech at
significantly less cost to the government than prosecutions under laws using sub-
sequent sanctions.
One factor weighing heavily against successfully establishing such a propo-
sition is that systems of administrative preclearance regulating activities other
than speech require formal procedures for information gathering and adjudica-
tion far more sophisticated and burdensome for the government than a solitary
66. Emerson, supra note 4, at 657.
67. Id.; see also Blasi, supra note 4, at 58-59 ("Injunctions are issued and permit applications
are denied 'by a stroke of the pen.'. .. No special burden of persuasion, and in most cases not even a
formal hearing, operates to check the suppressive stroke of the pen by a licensing official.").
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decision by an autonomous executive official. For example, the licensing and
oversight of nuclear facilities, 68 the testing and approval of new drugs, 6 9 the
issuance of patents,70 and even the procurement of military supplies and equip-
ment71 are all areas in which the government's administrative activity must con-
form to specific guidelines that require adherence to burdensome and often
expensive procedures. In fact, though it may be somewhat surprising given the
conventional rhetoric surrounding the doctrine of prior restraint, it is also true
that speech communicated by means of radio or television has for more than
fifty years been subject to a sophisticated and procedurally complex system of
administrative review and licensing.72
The import of this is not that systems of administrative review and licensing
are appropriate means by which to regulate speech simply because such systems
68. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, § 1, 68 Stat. 919, 921 (1954) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West 1988)), makes it unlawful for any person within the
United States to produce, possess, or use any nuclear power plant except under and in accordance
with a license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Act requires the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission to engage in a complicated and potentially contested hearing procedure in connec-
tion with the issuance or renewal of any such license. Id. § 2239(a)(1); 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.714-2.760
(1989).
69. Since 1938, federal law has required a detailed premarket review and approval by the Food
and Drug Administration of all new drugs before they are allowed to reach the market. Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982)) (especially sections 505 (d) and (e) of the Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 355 (d), (e) (1982)). According to an established text on the subject, "The [new drug licensing]
process leads to more extensive agency involvement in the decisionmaking of private manufacturers
than any other provision of the Act.... Among all of FDA's diverse programs, its responsibility for
licensing new drugs may be the single most important." R. MERRILL & P. HUNT, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 369 (1980). See Peskoe, The New Drug Approval Process-Changes
and Impacts, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 195 (1986); Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug
Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185 (1971).
70. The Commissioner of Patents establishes regulations for the Patent Office, including the
publication of "Rules of Practice in Patent Cases," which contains approximately 450 numbered
paragraphs establishing required procedures for the application, review, and issuance of patents. 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 1-14, 21-26, 31-33, 41-42, 111-122, 131-135, 141-146, 151-154, 251-256 (West 1984).
71. The primary statute governing the procurement of military equipment and supplies is the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-413, 62 Stat. 21 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). Two other important statutes regulating government activity in this
area are the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified as
amended in various sections of 5, 10, 31, 40, and 41 U.S.C.) and the Department of Defense Authori-
zation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 583 (1985) (codified as amended in various sections
of 10, 18, 31, 41, and 50 U.S.C.). For a general overview of the subject, see Mayer, Military Procure-
ment: Basic Principles and Recent Developments, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 165 (1987).
The procurement of military supplies and equipment is an especially complicated subset of the
generally highly regulated area of government contracting. The relevant regulations, known collec-
tively as the Federal Acquisition Regulations System, appear in 48 C.F.R. NATIONAL ARCHIVES &
RECORDS ADMIN. & OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS
SYSTEM (1988). This regulatory system includes an opportunity for frustrated contractors to file bid
protests. The protest claims are investigated and adjudicated by the Government Accounting Office.
4 C.F.R. §§ 21.0-21.12 (1988). See Tieder & Tracy, Forms and Remedies for Disappointed Bidders
on Federal Government Contracts, 10 PUB. CONT. L.J. 92 (1978); Weitzel, GAO Bid Protest Proce-
dures Under the Competition in Contracting Act: Constitutional Implications After Buckley and
Chadha, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 485 (1985).
72. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-610 (West 1988)); cf National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943) (the Communications Act of 1934 grants to the FCC broad discretion to regu-
late broadcasters in the public interest); see M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS ME-
DIA LAW 858-907 (3d ed. 1987).
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currently exist. Rather, it is that legislatures have demonstrated their capacity to
design systems of administrative preclearance and licensing that require of gov-
ernment officials far more than a single stroke of the pen to prohibit or approve
proposed behavior. Moreover, a well-developed body of law regarding judicial
review of administrative action is currently in place. 73
Further, and often underplayed in analyses of the prior restraint doctrine, is
the fact that constitutional law doctrines exist that are independent of the prior
restraint doctrine and that place significant limits on the design, scope, and oper-
ation of systems of administrative preclearance. Most notable in this regard are
the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness. 74
Given this current state of affairs, it does not seem persuasive to suggest
that systems of administrative preclearance involving speech somehow systemat-
ically will fall outside of this existing structure and will be designed to require
only a minimum of government effort to effect suppression. 75 In other words,
there is no reason to believe that prior restraint in the form of administrative
preclearance will permit regulation of speech at an unusually low cost to the
government.
An even more serious problem for the ease of suppression argument is that
while the creation and maintenance of such systems frequently involves substan-
tial government resources, subsequent sanctions are by comparison a tremen-
dous bargain. This is because existing laws in the form of subsequent sanctions
provide for civil liability in response to pure speech. Such laws, including most
notably the defamation cause of action, generate powerful deterrents to speech
without expending any government resources at all, save for the dispute resolu-
tion resources of the judiciary. Consequently, one can say accurately that there
are laws in the form of subsequent sanctions, not just imagined but currently in
force, that routinely lead to the prosecution of pure speech at virtually no margi-
nal cost to the government. In this environment, it is not possible to support a
73. This well-developed body of law includes statutes, regulations, judicial opinions and agency
decisions generally gathered under the rubric of Administrative Law, anchored by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (repealed and reenacted by Pub. L. No. 89-554
§§ 551-59, 701-06, 80 Stat. 378, 381-88, 392-93 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-59,
701-06 (West 1988)). Sections 701 through 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act deal with the
judicial review of administrative agency action.
74. A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it sweeps within its coverage protected speech
as well as conduct that constitutionally can be prohibited. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 131-32 (1974); R. ROTUNDA, supra note 38, § 20.8, at 24-33; Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852-58 (1970). A statute is unconstitutionally vague if
it fails to communicate to a person of average intelligence the legally required or prohibited conduct.
See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948); R.ROTUNDA, supra note 38, § 20.9, at 34-37;
Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
75. One possible response to this observation is to accept that the likelihood is not great that
plausible systems of administrative preclearance of speech will differ markedly from existing systems
of administrative preclearance that focus on nonspeech behavior and to argue instead that it is the
special constitutional protection afforded speech that warrants blanket disfavor of such systems
when they are applied to primarily expressive activities. While there are arguments asserting the
primacy of constitutional protection of speech over constitutional protection of other activities, their
evaluation does not fall within the scope of this article. See T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970); Blasi, supra note 4, at 78-80; Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1284 (1983).
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doctrine that views such laws as relatively benign and that subjects all systems of
administrative preclearance to especially strict judicial scrutiny on the basis that
all, or even the majority of, such systems present the government with the op-
portunity to regulate speech at significantly less cost than do subsequent
sanctions.76
Finally, it should be noted again that first amendment concerns regarding
the relative ease of suppression of one scheme of regulation over another are
only constitutionally relevant if it can be established that the more efficient
schemes of regulation consistently tend to suppress speech that is constitution-
ally protected. In the absence of such a tendency, greater efficiency generally
should be regarded as an attractive attribute of a given system of legal
regulation.
Taking this line of reasoning one step further, one might argue that claims
of greater efficiency with respect to systems of administrative preclearance may
be irrelevant in any case. To the extent it can be shown that such laws consist-
ently suppress constitutionally protected speech, their constitutional status
under the first amendment more properly should be analyzed and determined
under the established doctrine of overbreadth. 77 In this context, the question of
whether such laws are or are not prior restraints is irrelevant. The attempt to
characterize laws as prior restraints based on the likelihood of such laws being
applied to constitutionally protected behavior results in little more than the
recharacterization of the doctrine of overbreadth as the doctrine of prior
restraint. 78
3. Propensity to Suppress
Most important, administrative preclearance requires a bureau-
cracy of censorship. Persons who choose to fill this role may well have
psychological tendencies to overstate the need for suppression.
Whether or not this is so, there are powerful institutional pressures to
justify one's job, and ultimately one's own importance, by exaggerating
76. In this context it also could be argued that a legal regime that prohibits the regulation of
speech by means of judicial injunctions and systems of administrative preclearance while providing
for the possibility of civil liability for speech is highly regressive. That is to say that such a regime
strongly favors the expressive interests of the wealthy, including corporations, because this subset of
society enjoys a marked relative advantage both in pursuing and defending against civil liability
based on speech. In effect, this argument suggests that a legal regime that systematically refuses to
allow the collectivization of speech regulation through the government provides a powerful practical
speech advantage to those who can most easily access and effectively use the levers of the civil
liability system.
77. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); 3 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 38, § 20.8, at 24-33; L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 12-27 to -28, at
1022-29; Redish, The Warren Court, The Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031 (1983); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 844 (1970).
78. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 425 (The overbreadth doctrine provides a "more informative
frame of reference" for examination of preclearance requirements than does the doctrine of prior
restraint; "A rule of special hostility to administrative preclearance is just another way of saying that
determination under the overbreadth doctrine should take account not only of the substance of the
law but also of the structure of its administration.").
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the evils which suppression seeks to avoid.79
This third line of argument is particularly interesting because its message
has been echoed by many commentators. For example, in addition to the pas-
sage by Professor John Jeffries quoted above, Professor Thomas Emerson has
written:
Perhaps the most significant feature of systems of prior restraint is
that they contain within themselves forces which drive irresistibly to-
ward unintelligent, overzealous, and usually absurd administration.
One factor is the ability and personality of the licensor or censor....
No adequate study seems to have been made of the psychology of
licensers, censors, security officials, and their kind, but common expe-
rience is sufficient to show that their attitudes, drives, emotions, and
impulses all tend to carry them to excesses.80
More recently, Professor Martin Redish wrote, "Nonjudicial administrative
regulators of expression exist for the sole purpose of regulating; this is their
raison d'etre. They simultaneously perform the functions of prosecutor and ad-
judicator and, if only subconsciously, will likely feel the obligation to justify
their existence by finding some expression constitutionally subject to regula-
tion." 8' The Supreme Court also has echoed this theme: "Because the censor's
business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive
than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the constitu-
tionally protected interests in free expression."'82
Given the frequency with which this argument is advanced, it is surprising
to note in these presentations a complete absence of supporting empirical evi-
dence. After all, without empirical support, or at least the development of a
more sophisticated a priori argument, the basic thrust of this argument amounts
to little more than an expression of distrust of governmental administrators as
decisionmakers, or, as the argument is sometimes phrased, a strong preference
for judicial decisionmakers.S3 Preference becomes prejudice, however, in the ab-
sence of supporting evidence. Moreover, given that the persons advancing this
argument are themselves judges and law professors, the expression of such a
strong preference for legally trained decisionmakers can be seen as somewhat
parochial.
As Professor Howard Hunter has observed, a formal preference for judicial
decisionmakers in matters of speech regulation is ironic given the actual history
79. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 422.
80. Emerson, supra note 4, at 658.
81. Redish, supra note 4, at 76-77.
82. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1975) ("An administrative board assigned to screening stage pro-
ductions-and keeping off stage anything not deemed culturally uplifting or healthful-may well be
less responsive than a court, an independent branch of government, to constitutionally protected
interests in free expression." (footnote omitted)); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) (approv-
ingly quoting the above passage from Freedman); Blasi, supra note 4, at 33 ("Concern about the
biases of administrative censors has always been a prominent part of the case against licensing
speech.").
83. See Mayton, supra note 4, at 253; Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv.
L. REV. 518, 523 (1970); Redish, supra note 4, at 77.
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of judicial suppression of speech, especially in those instances in which judges
perceive free speech rights as being in conflict with the operation of a fair trial.84
This is, of course, a setting in which the judges' own bureaucratic interests are
most clearly at stake. Professor Hunter writes:
[T]he sixth amendment "fair trial" cases have produced a flurry of
"gag orders," courtroom closures, and other limitations on both access
to trials and dissemination of information about them.
.... Analysis of recent actions in this area demonstrates that (1)
the denial of access to information, to a place, or to an event such as a
trial is an extraordinarily effective method of restricting the dissemina-
tion of information; and (2) except as limited by the Supreme Court,
trial judges have been almost frenetic in their rush to issue orders de-
nying access.85
Instead of intuition suggesting that judges should be the preferred deci-
sionmakers in matters of speech regulation, it may well be that administrative
officials, operating under a system of administrative preclearance and possessing
a desire to promote and maintain broad popular support for the particular bu-
reaucracy in which they work, will be relatively more risk-averse in their deci-
sionmaking. Thus administrative officials may be relatively less prone to
suppression of speech than judicial officers, who, after all, enjoy a much greater
degree of formal insulation from popular opinion and from the Congress. It
should also be noted in this context that the decision with respect to the exist-
ence and size of a speaker's liability under many laws in the form of subsequent
sanctions, such as defamation laws, frequently rests with a jury. There is little
reason to believe that juries will be more tolerant, and some reason to believe
that they will be far less tolerant, of unpopular speech and unpopular speakers
than will officials operating within a system of administrative preclearance. 86 In
any case, in the absence of empirical support in one direction or the other, intui-
tive preferences for judicial decisionmakers, no matter how frequently sounded,
84. Hunter, supra note 4, at 287-92; see, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988); State ex reL Post-Tribune Publishing Co. v. Porter Superior
Court, 274 Ind. 408, 412 N.E.2d 748 (1980); Federated Publications v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13,
633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
The opinion in United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972), exemplifies this sort of
judicial behavior.
[United States v. Dickinson] ... gave impetus to the issuing of protective or restraining
orders-what the press prefers to call "gag" orders-in criminal cases. Court proceedings
and court records were closed. Names ofjurors and witnesses, criminal records, and arrest
records were sealed. Prior restraints were imposed by forbidding publication of informa-
tion about exhibits, pleas, jury verdicts, and editorial comment on guilt or innocence.
D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW CASES AND COMMENT 502 (4th ed.
1984).
85. Hunter, supra note 4, at 288-89. Having set forth these observations, Professor Hunter
concludes by stating, "Ultimately, then, there is no good reason to prefer judges as a class over
administrative licensors as a class, provided that the charge to the two classes is similar." Id. at 292.
Another lesson that follows from this analysis is that the first amendment should be interpreted
to prefer fully neutral decisionmakers in those cases in which speech interests are at stake. Under
such an interpretation, judges presiding over a case should not rule on motions made by the parties
that potentially pit free speech interests against the possibility of a fair and orderly trial.
86. See supra note 54. /
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constitute an insufficient foundation upon which to construct basic constitu-
tional doctrine.
This third line of argument presents still another problem. Imagine a regu-
lar system of administrative preclearance and licensing that is clearly constitu-
tional but for its possible characterization as a prior restraint. A government
official operating within such a system has, in effect, the power to create a legal
climate in which a sanction may be imposed legitimately on a speaker if the
disapproved or unlicensed speech is in fact expressed. This is, in essence, no
different from the power that now resides in and is exercised by all state legisla-
tures, as well as Congress, when enacting legislation in the form of subsequent
sanctions. In either case, nonjudicial decisionmakers are primarily responsible
both for identifying the disfavored speech and establishing the range of appropri-
ate legal sanctions. Assuming the existence of no other constitutional defect in
the regulatory scheme, there seems to be no special reason to object to the legis-
lative branch delegating this power, under proper guidelines, to the executive
branch. Legislatures, after all, have delegated such authority for decades. Pre-
cisely this situation exists at present, and has existed for more than fifty years
without successful constitutional challenge, in the regulation of radio and televi-
sion broadcasts.8 7 Given the continued vitality of this regulatory structure, it
makes little sense to assert that significant regulatory discretion in the hands of
administrative officials could possibly serve as the basis for a definition of pre-
sumptively unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.
This basic characterization of the work of officials operating within a sys-
tem of administrative preclearance also can serve to refute attempts to distin-
guish prior restraints from subsequent sanctions on the basis of what has been
called "adjudication in the abstract." s8 8 In his 1981 article on the subject of
prior restraint, Professor Vincent Blasi writes:
One phenomenon common to licensing systems and injunctions gov-
erned by the collateral bar rule is what might be termed adjudication
in the abstract. Under both systems, the final authoritative judicial
decision regarding the legal status of a disputed communication takes
place before the moment of initial dissemination. That typically is not
true under the subsequent punishment regimes. When adjudication
precedes initial dissemination, the communication cannot be judged by
its actual consequences or public reception. The adjudicative assess-
ment of speech value versus social harm must be made in the abstract,
based on speculation or generalizations embodied in presumptions. 89
If by the phrase "the final authoritative judicial decision regarding the legal
status of a disputed communication," Professor Blasi is referring to the point at
which someone formally determines, as a fact-finding matter, that a particular
hypothetical instance of speech will, if expressed, violate the prohibitions of a
preexisting statute, then adjudication in the abstract and its corresponding
87. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
88. Blasi, supra note 4, at 49.
89. Id.
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problems90 will arise in the case of judicial injunctions and systems of adminis-
trative preclearance to a greater degree than in the case of laws in the form of
subsequent sanctions only to the extent that such laws define the targeted speech
in terms of the harm that the speech inflicts. An example of such a law is defa-
mation, which defines the kind of speech giving rise to legal liability on the basis
of whether the speech can be shown to have injured the reputation of another.9 1
When applying such a law in a given case, judges and juries have the ability to
work with established historical facts, including after-the-fact assessments of the
actual harm caused by the targeted speech, in determining whether or not to
impose legal liability.
Not all laws using subsequent sanctions take this approach, however; some
define the targeted speech without any reference to the actual harm caused by
the speech. A common example of such laws are those sometimes referred to as
the "Son of Sam" statutes.92 These laws, existing in at least thirty-six states and
in federal law,93 generally require a person convicted of a crime to forfeit the
proceeds earned from the sale of rights to a reenactment or depiction of that
crime, regardless of whether the sale of such rights can be shown to have gener-
ated injury or harm.94 When dealing with such a statute, or with any law that
90. See Blasi, supra note 4, at 49-54.
91. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771-78 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1977) ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.").
92. These statutes are so named because the first such law was enacted in New York in re-
sponse to the activities of David Berkowitz, the notorious "Son of Sam" killer. Barrett v. Wojtow-
icz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 608, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1977,
at A20, col. 3.
93. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3681-3682 (West Supp. 1989); ALA. CODE
§§ 41-9-80 to 41-9-84 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
4201 to 13-4202 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-90-308 (1987); CAL. Ctv. CODE § 2225 (West
Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-201 to 24-4.1-207 (Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-9106 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512
(West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to 17-14-32 (1982 & Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 401-414 (Smith-Hurd 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
7-3.7-1 to 16-7-3.7-6 (Burns 1983 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West Supp. 1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to 74-7321 (Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831-1839 (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 764 (1987); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258A, § 8 (1980 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68
(West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045 (11) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104 (1)(d)
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to 81-1840 (1981 & Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 217.265 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 52:413-26 to 52:4B-33 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01 to 2969.06 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17
(West Supp. 1987); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 180-7.18 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 12-25.1-1 to 12-25.1-12 (Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-59-40 to 15-59-80 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-1 to 23A-28A-14 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-13-201 to 29-13-208 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 16 to 18
(Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.200
to 7.68.280 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. § 1-40-112
(Supp. 1987).
94. For example, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987) provides as
follows:
Distribution of moneys received as a result of the commission of crime.
1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity con-
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does not define the targeted speech by reference to the harm generated by that
speech, courts do not have the benefit of after-the-fact assessments of the actual
harm caused by the targeted speech in determining whether to impose legal lia-
bility. This is true not because such assessments are inherently unavailable but
because such assessments are, pursuant to the terms of the law, legally irrelevant
to the issue of liability.
From a more general perspective, it is clear that to the extent laws utilizing
subsequent sanctions define the targeted speech without reference to the harm
actually inflicted by the speech, legislatures enact such laws through a process of
prior adjudication that is as fully abstract and "based upon speculation or gener-
alization embodied in presumptions" as the kind of prospective judgments made
by judges issuing injunctions and executive officials operating within a system of
administrative preclearance. Given the continued existence of just such laws, 95
it is not descriptively accurate to distinguish between prior restraints and subse-
quent sanctions on the basis of the existence of adjudication in the abstract. 96
One final point. Imagine again a regular system of administrative
preclearance and licensing of certain speech that is unquestionably constitu-
tional but for its possible characterization as a prior restraint. It might well be
that an administrative official operating within such a system will possess the
practical power, if not the formal authority, to initiate legal proceedings once it
has been shown that the unapproved or unlicensed speech has been expressed.
The discretion exercised by an administrative official in such a situation is no
different from the discretion now exercised by a prosecutor, who is also a gov-
ernment official, when deciding whether to initiate legal proceedings with re-
spect to a possible violation of a law in the form of a subsequent sanction. The
administrative official's discretion also is not remarkably different from that ex-
ercised by a private citizen deciding whether to initiate legal proceedings with
respect to a perceived cause of action under civil law. Because none of the three
decisionmakers in these typical situations is a judicial officer, it makes little sense
to adopt or maintain an interpretation of the prior restraint doctrine, assertedly
based on the comparative constitutional undesirability of nonjudicial deci-
sionmakers, that characterizes the first situation as a prior restraint, thus sub-
jecting it to especially strict scrutiny, while at the same time characterizing the
tracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, accused of a crime
in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book,
magazine article, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from
the expression of such person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such
crime, shall pay over to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such
contract, be owing to the person so convicted or his representatives. The board shall de-
posit such moneys in an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim of
crimes committed by such person, provided that such person is eventually convicted of the
crime and provided further that such victim, within five years of the date of the crime,
brings a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judgment
against such person or his representatives.
95. No court yet has found a "Son of Sam" law to violate the first amendment.
96. This is not to say, however, that the existence of adjudication in the abstract should not
serve as an appropriate independent basis upon which constitutionally to disfavor laws that exhibit
that trait, regardless of the law's status with respect to the prior restraint doctrine.
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latter two situations as examples of relatively nonproblematic subsequent
sanctions.
In fact, all of the problems identified by the proponents of this third line of
argument regarding officials operating within systems of administrative
preclearance would apply equally to settings in which administrative officials,
such as government prosecutors and other officials, participate in decisions re-
garding the initiation of formal legal proceedings against suspected violators of
laws that exclusively utilize subsequent sanctions. Due to the obvious similarity,
at least in this context, between administrative officials exercising discretion
within a system of administrative preclearance and administrative officials exer-
cising discretion with respect to the prosecution of suspected violators of laws
using subsequent sanctions, the perceived deficiencies of administrative officials
as decisionmakers, even if accepted as true, hardly serve as a rational basis to
distinguish between prior restraints and subsequent sanctions.
V. DEFINING PRIOR RESTRAINTS BY REFERENCE
TO THEIR ASSERTED ATTRIBUTES
Sections II and III of this Article demonstrate the fundamental problem
with the current doctrine of prior restraint-the lack of logical coherence in the
substantive distinction upon which the doctrine is based, the distinction between
prior restraints and subsequent sanctions. Apparently reluctant to retire the
doctrine, however, judges and scholars have attempted to resolve this fundamen-
tal problem by defining prior restraints as those laws that possess one or more
disfavored attributes said to be characteristic of laws traditionally deemed prior
restraints. 97 Section IV of this Article demonstrates that these disfavored attrib-
utes are not more strongly or more consistently associated with traditional prior
restraints than they are with laws in the form of subsequent sanctions.
If the argument presented in section IV is accepted, then the definitional
strategy that has become so much a part of the common wisdom surrounding
the doctrine of prior restraint is exposed as being essentially circular in nature.
The strategy involves replacing a doctrine that purportedly disfavors prior re-
straints with a doctrine that instead disfavors laws possessing one or more par-
ticular attributes, regardless of whether the identified attributes are uniquely, or
even predominantly, characteristic of traditional prior restraints. By using the
presence of certain undesirable characteristics as criteria for defining the disfa-
vored category of prior restraint, the doctrine becomes internally self-justifying
and therefore, from a legal point of view, tautological. So long as the members
of the disfavored category of prior restraints are chosen because they possess
certain undesirable characteristics, then the prior restraint doctrine itself, which
mandates that all members of the prior restraint category be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny, always will be facially rational. The problem is that the doc-
trine, when developed in this way, adds nothing substantive to legal analysis. Its
application to a given set of facts does not resolve the issue of a particular law's
97. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 and 64-66.
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constitutional status in one way or the other. The prior restraint doctrine does
not serve to uncover or illuminate constitutionally relevant factors that may be
present in a challenged law or regulation. Instead, all of the serious substantive
analysis takes place when deciding whether to apply the doctrine at all-in de-
ciding whether a particular law is or is not a prior restraint.
The difference between a genuinely substantive doctrine of prior restraint
and the current version of the doctrine is the difference between having substan-
tive reasons for disfavoring members of an independently definable category and
determining the members of a category exclusively by reference to the substan-
tive reasons for disfavoring them. This latter approach is meaningful only to the
extent that a high correlation exists between the population of the suspect cate-
gory as determined by its overt definition or label and the population of the
suspect category as determined by the presence in its members of the factors
cited for disfavoring the category.
As a simple example of this point, suppose that there existed in a hypotheti-
cal pond fish of many colors and a variety of flavors. Over time, it is determined
that the unappealing taste of yellow-colored fish make them barely edible.
Thereafter, it becomes a standard rule among fishermen in the relevant commu-
nity not to keep for human consumption any yellow fish caught. This is an
example of the first categorizing strategy referred to above. The label given to
the disfavored category, in this case "yellow," is independently determinable and
it correlates highly with an important characteristic shared by the members of
the category as so defined, in this case their unappetizing taste.
Now suppose that the initial unhappy experience of consuming yellow fish
led instead to a general rule among fishermen that no brightly colored fish
should be caught for human consumption. Over time, the fishermen become
more sophisticated in their approach and they recognize that many brightly
colored fish are in fact delicious while a number of dark-colored fish are not
good to eat. Nonetheless, the term "bright" continues to be used to connote
unappetizing fish, and the general rule among fishermen remains that "bright"
fish should not be caught for-human consumption, even though the generally
accepted definition of that word among fishermen includes some fish that are in
fact brightly colored and some fish that are unquestionably dark-colored.
This is an example of the second categorizing strategy referred to above.
To preserve a generally accepted categorical rule, in this case the general rule
that brightly colored fish should not be caught for human consumption, the fa-
cial category label is maintained, but the members of the category increasingly
are defined not by reference to the label. Instead they are defined by reference to
whether they deserve the result that the categorical rule dictates. In this case,
unappetizing fish should not be kept for human consumption, and that result
effectively is reached by using the categorical rule so long as only unappetizing
fish are described as being "bright," regardless of their actual coloring.
In this kind of categorizing scheme, the factors used by the fishermen to
determine which fish are and which are not appetizing are not revealed by look-
ing only to the generally accepted categorical rule. The categorical rule uses the
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term "bright" as little more than a linguistic surrogate for the substantive fac-
tors, or patterns of behavior, that are in fact employed to determine the attrac-
tiveness of the fish for human consumption.
This kind of categorical rule may be workable when employed within a
relatively small and stable community of users. Such users may be able to deter-
mine to a reasonable degree of certainty the current definition of the category
label by frequent exposure to the actual operation of the rule. Even in a large
and diverse community, the use of this kind of categorical scheme may be effec-
tive, and perhaps necessary, in those cases in which it is not practically possible
to explicitly articulate the bases upon which the relevant categorical decisions
are made. For example, it is difficult to articulate, at least in any generic way,
the specific factors that a jury uses to determine whether a defendant in a tort
suit was at fault in causing harm to the plaintiff. For the purpose of formulating
a general categorical rule, we often use the term "negligent." Thus we say that
the tort defendant will be made to pay the plaintiff if the jury finds the defendant
negligent. Largely because "negligent" is an unusual word that possesses little
or no meaning in our language outside of the context of legal fault and responsi-
bility, its use as a part of a general categorical rule regarding tort liability
strongly indicates to an untutored member of the community that the term may
carry with it in practice an unfamiliar or nonobvious meaning.
From this perspective, the worst of all possible categorical rules to be em-
ployed in a large and pluralistic community would be one that uses as its cate-
gory label a term possessing some independent meaning in the language and at
the same time interprets the term for purposes of the rule in a nonobvious or
counterintuitive manner. The use of such a categorical rule can be deeply de-
structive, encouraging the uninitiated to incorrectly apply the result that the rule
dictates. Consider, for example, the novice fisherman or fish consumer who has
learned the categorical rule but who is unaware of the special meaning that the
term "bright" has acquired over time. He will inevitably throw back a lot of
good-tasting brightly colored fish and keep many unappetizing dark ones.98
98. A less hypothetical example of a categorical rule that uses its category label in a generally
unfamiliar way is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), prohibiting a public official from recovering in a defamation action for state-
ments made about her official conduct unless the public official proves that the statements were made
with actual malice. Id. at 279. Actual malice is defined for the purposes of this rule as knowledge by
the defendant that the statements were false or reckless disregard on the part of the defendant of
whether the statements were false or not. Id. at 279-80. The inevitable confusion that has resulted
from such a counterintuitive use of this phrase has been well noted. See, eg., Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Although I joined the Court's opinion in New York
Times, I have come greatly to regret the use in that opinion of the phrase 'actual malice.' For the
fact of the matter is that 'malice' as used in the New York Times opinion simply does not mean
malice as that word is commonly understood."); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104
N.J. 125, 151, 516 A.2d 220, 233 (1986) ("The term 'malice' caused enough confusion when it was
confined to the common law, but now that it has assumed a constitutional dimension, the confusion
is compounded. Understandably, the differing definitions of 'malice' have confounded trial
courts."); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 363 n.1, 568 P.2d 1359, 1361
n. 1 (1977) ("The term 'actual malice' is used by the Court to describe knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard of the truth. This is unfortunate and will lead to confusion because it does not mean
hate, ill will or intention to harm, which is usually termed 'express malice,' or 'common law malice'
and sometimes 'actual malice.' "Actual malice,' as used by the Supreme Court of the United States, is
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In attempting to maintain the viability of the prior restraint doctrine, courts
and legal commentators have transformed it into this kind of a rule. The cate-
gory label "prior restraints" has been retained, but the category has been defined
in ways that bear no reasonable relation to the common-sense meaning of the
category label. In fact, the category has been defined so that the only common
thread between members of the category is that they have been deemed to pos-
sess certain characteristics that make them deserving of the result that the rule
dictates. 99 Worse still, the traditional stalwart members of the category of prior
restraint, judicial injunctions and systems of administrative preclearance, do not
themselves reliably and consistently possess the characteristics now thought to
define the category. 1° °
VI. REDEFINING PRIOR RESTRAINTS: A LITERAL APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEM
Given the highly problematic nature of the current version of the prior re-
straint doctrine, one question that naturally arises is whether it would not be
best simply to retire the doctrine. One prominent legal scholar, Professor John
Jeffries, has examined the Supreme Court's activity in the area of prior restraints
and has reached this conclusion:
In sum, therefore, I suggest that in confronting these and similar
questions the conventional doctrine of prior restraint be laid to one
side. In my judgment, that doctrine is so far removed from its historic
function, so variously invoked and discrepantly applied, and so often
deflective of sound understanding, that it no longer warrants use as an
independent category of First Amendment analysis.101
Although Professor Jeffries' work in this area is largely unassailable, and
although the foregoing analysis demonstrates the difficulty involved in develop-
ing an operationally meaningful distinction between prior restraints and subse-
quent sanctions, there remains an appropriate place in first amendment
jurisprudence for a doctrine subjecting government actions resulting in a prior
restraint on speech to strict constitutional scrutiny. Preserving such a role for
the doctrine of prior restraint, however, requires rather radical semantic surgery.
It will require that the concept of prior restraint be taken literally.
The key to placing the prior restraint doctrine on sounder conceptual foot-
ing is a realignment of the legal definition of "prior restraint" with the common-
sense meaning of the phrase. To that end, I propose that both the doctrinal and
the operational definitions of "prior restraint" be revised to include all govern-
ment actions, and only those government actions, that result in the physical
not malice at all."); Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 859 & nn.76-77
(1985); Note, The Triumph of the Press: New Jersey Departs from Federal Trends in Libel Law, 36
RUTGERS L. REv. 91, 92-94 nn. 13 & 20 (1983); Note, "Actual Malice" and the Standard of Proof in
Defamation Cases in California: A Proposal for a Single Constitutional Standard, 16 Sw. U.L. REv.
577, 589-93 (1986).
99. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 43-96 and accompanying text.
101. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 437.
[Vol. 68
1989] PRIOR RESTRAINT
interception and suppression of speech prior to its public expression. 102 "Physi-
cal interception and suppression of speech" should mean literally the effective
prevention by the government, either through confiscation or by any other phys-
ical means, of any speaker's attempt to communicate an idea, thought or opinion
to the public at large. The prior restraint doctrine then would operate to charac-
terize all such government action as a presumptively unconstitutional violation
of the first amendment. 103
Excluded from the scope of this proposed definition of prior restraint are
schemes of government regulation that do not impose sanctions on a speaker
until the offending communication in fact has taken place. Therefore, judicial
injunctions prohibiting speech that are not violated until the prohibited commu-
nication occurs and systems of administrative preclearance that encourage com-
pliance by the threat of subsequent punishment would not come within the
purview of this proposed definition. This does not mean that government activi-
ties of this sort would, or should, be viewed as being constitutionally acceptable
under the first amendment. It simply means that the resolution of questions
regarding the constitutionality of such activities would no longer involve an in-
vocation or application of the prior restraint doctrine.
This proposed revision of the prior restraint doctrine possesses a number of
attractive features that the current version lacks. From a doctrinal point of
102. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will sometimes refer to this proposed redefinition of
prior restraint as "literal prior restraint" or "literal prior restraints."
103. Two qualifications embedded in this proposed definition should be highlighted. One is that
the definition is intended only to cover expression that is not inextricably part of some otherwise
problematic physical behavior; the kind of expression sometimes known as "pure" speech. See supra
note 2. Government actions designed physically to prevent the publication of a newspaper or a
book, or to prevent public broadcast of certain information, as contrasted with the government regu-
lation, necessarily "prior," of more physical forms of expression, such as mass demonstrations and
other physical symbolic acts, present such fundamentally different sets of practical, political and
constitutional problems that the inclusion of both forms of expression under a uniform doctrine of
prior restraint is unwise and unworkable. Therefore, the proposed reform of the prior restraint
doctrine advanced herein is intended only to provide special constitutional protection for pure
speech and would not apply necessarily to the prior restraint of potentially symbolic physical behav-
ior.
The Supreme Court itself, at least implicitly, has recognized a difference in the treatment of
pure speech and mixed speech and conduct in the prior restraint context. While the Supreme Court
never has found a prior restraint on pure speech to be constitutional, it has on at least two occasions
upheld prior restraints on mixed speech and conduct. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)
(upholding temporary injunction enjoining certain individuals from participating in or encouraging
street demonstrations without required permit); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258
(1947) (upholding restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the United Mine Workers
from issuing a strike notice to its members). Lower courts have followed its lead. State v. Chavez,
123 Ariz. 538, 543, 601 P.2d 301, 306 (1979) (upholding preliminary injunction prohibiting picket-
ing by the United Farm Workers); Mead School Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wash. 2d 278, 285,
534 P.2d 561, 567 (1975) (en bane) (upholding temporary injunction prohibiting teachers' strike).
The second qualification worth noting is that the proposed definition is intended to encompass,
and thus to protect, only communications by speakers to the public at large. Therefore government
actions designed physically to intercept the communication of certain information between two indi-
viduals, or between a very limited number of individuals, would not necessarily be covered. This
limitation primarily is intended to exclude from the operation of the prior restraint doctrine situa-
tions in which the United States Government attempts physically to intercept the communication of
sensitive national security information to agents of other governments. It is not intended, however,
to exclude those situations in which such information is being communicated to the public at large.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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view, it presents a relatively coherent, generally understandable, and largely pre-
dictable definition of a prior restraint on speech. The development of such a
definition would enable potential speakers to predict with greater accuracy
whether a particular governmental sanction ultimately will be deemed unconsti-
tutional as a prior restraint. Only this kind of predictability in the content and
application of first amendment standards creates a meaningful legal sanctuary in
which free speech can flourish. Similarly, a more direct and understandable def-
inition of prior restraint will serve as a more powerful and effective guide to
legislatures as they enact new, and amend old, laws relating to speech.
In addition, this proposed version of the prior restraint doctrine is more
rational from a policy point of view with respect to the critical distinction be-
tween prior restraints and subsequent sanctions. Once it is determined that the
phrase "prior restraint" should include within its scope only those governmental
actions in fact resulting in the physical prevention of speech prior to its public
expression, then it is clear that prior restraints, as a class, pose a greater practi-
cal deterrent to constitutionally protected speech than do all other laws. This is
the case because actual physical restraint is a far more effective form of speech
suppression than almost any scheme of threatened legal sanction that is not im-
posed until after the public expression of the prohibited speech.
Moreover, and most significantly from the perspective of preventing the
chilling of constitutionally protected speech, every instance of a literal prior re-
straint 1° 4 will by definition involve the actual suppression of speech. This is not
the case with respect to laws that have been determined to come within the
scope of the current doctrine of prior restraint,10 5 nor is it the case with respect
to laws utilizing subsequent sanctions. Judicial injunctions are sometimes not
obeyed.106 Speakers may on occasion communicate information without first
having obtained the required license. In either case, the speech that is targeted
by the legal regulation may be well chilled, but it will not necessarily be frozen.
Precisely the same analysis applies when the applicable legal regulation is a law
using subsequent sanctions107
Under the proposed revision of the prior restraint doctrine, however, every
instance of a prior restraint will result in the suppression of speech. The impor-
tant, and necessary, consequence of this fact is that every constitutional mistake
made in the implementation of a literal prior restraint will involve the actual
suppression of constitutionally protected speech. This is not the case with re-
spect to the current doctrine of prior restraint, nor is it the case with respect to
laws utilizing subsequent sanctions. This disparity fully justifies creating a for-
mal legal distinction between literal prior restraints and all other laws and
104. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
106. The numbers of such instances in the area of speech may well increase since the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's recent decision allowing a newspaper that violated a
court order barring the publication of certain trial-related documents to avoid prosecution for crimi-
nal contempt on the grounds that the order constituted a "transparently invalid" prior restraint on
speech. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g, 820 F.2d
1354 (1st Cir. 1987).
107. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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makes sense of the application of especially strict judicial scrutiny to all in-
stances of literal prior restraints. In other words, it is primarily because literal
prior restraints on speech significantly increase the practical stakes involved that
it becomes possible to argue persuasively that such laws should be separately
identified and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny through the operation of an
independent constitutional doctrine.
Perhaps most importantly, the adoption of this proposed version of the
prior restraint doctrine, due to its greater clarity, would result in stronger consti-
tutional protection against government suppression of speech prior to its public
expression. The practical value of this protection, to the extent that it now ex-
ists, is severely compromised by the confusion and indeterminacy that character-
ize the current prior restraint doctrine. It is important that constitutional
protection against government activity that involves the physical suppression of
speech prior to its public expression be clear and unambiguous because the prac-
tical consequence of such activity is that the targeted speech does not enter the
public domain. When speech that the government attempts to suppress does not
enter the public domain, the opportunity for democratic public oversight of, and
reaction to, the speech-suppressive activities of the government is severely re-
stricted, if not completely foreclosed.
A corollary to this argument, advanced by Professor Martin Redish,10 8 is
that judicial use of the prior restraint doctrine to resolve first amendment issues
has in some cases turned the Court's focus away from more fundamental first
amendment concerns and thus created an unnecessary chilling effect on consti-
tutionally protected speech. For example, in those cases in which government
conduct violates the first amendment even if not found to be a prior restraint on
speech, the Court's reliance on the prior restraint doctrine to invalidate the con-
duct leaves open the possibility that this same speech-suppressive activity might
be found constitutional if sufficiently redesigned and recast in the form of a sub-
sequent sanction. Legislatures may respond to this possibility by authorizing
similar government conduct in the form of laws using subsequent sanctions.
Persons wishing to publish material that is the object of such laws certainly will
think twice before relying upon a judicial finding of unconstitutionality.
It is also important in this context to note that adopting the proposed ver-
sion of the prior restraint doctrine does not mean that judicial injunctions
against speech or systems of administrative preclearance should be free of strict
scrutiny under a first amendment analysis. It means instead that the specific
attributes of individual judicial injunctions and particular systems of administra-
tive preclearance more properly should be understood and analyzed through the
perspective of other constitutional doctrines, most notably the doctrine of over-
breadth,109 rather than through the disorienting and ultimately irrational per-
spective of the prior restraint doctrine.
Further, acceptance of the more literal version of the prior restraint doc-
trine might well facilitate the development within first amendment jurisprudence
108. See Redish, supra note 4, at 54.
109. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 425.
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of a doctrine that would characterize as presumptively unconstitutional judicial
injunctions and systems of administrative preclearance of speech that can be
shown to actually possess one or more of the particular operational characteris-
tics and undesirable attributes now thought to define the entire category of prior
restraints. In other words, adoption of a more literal version of the prior re-
straint doctrine could be the catalyst for the development of a more direct and
relevant first amendment jurisprudence dealing with judicial injunctions and sys-
tems of administrative preclearance.
A doctrine dealing directly with systems of administrative preclearance, for
example, could be based upon the potential for such systems: (1) to permit the
denial of a permit or a license without sufficient investigatory procedures or ade-
quate judicial review; (2) to place an unacceptable burden of initiative on poten-
tial speakers; or (3) to delay or disrupt the timing of speech. Because these
potentially speech-suppressive problems are not necessarily associated with gov-
ernment efforts to physically suppress speech prior to its public expression, it is
appropriate, and conducive to much greater clarity in first amendment analysis,
that such a doctrine develop independently from the doctrine of prior restraint.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of prior restraint long has been a source of confusion and
controversy. This confusion has resulted both from inconsistent application of
the doctrine by the courts and from a logical incoherence in the current legal
distinction between prior restraints and subsequent sanctions. Courts and legal
scholars have sought to rescue the doctrine from this incoherence by defining
prior restraints as a set of speech-related laws that are characterized by their
possession of certain undesirable attributes. Although these efforts are currently
popular and capable of producing widely accepted results in specific cases, they
are destined to fail because even the most traditional and paradigmatic prior
restraints do not consistently possess these undesirable attributes to any greater
degree than laws classified as subsequent sanctions.
This Article proposes that the legal definition of prior restraint be changed
to include only those government actions that result in the physical interception
and suppression of speech prior to its public expression. Once prior restraints
are redefined in this way, it would then be true, as it is not now, that prior
restraints would pose a greater practical deterrent to constitutionally protected
speech than do all other speech-related laws. This is the case because: (1) actual
physical restraint is a far more practically effective form of speech suppression
than any scheme of threatened legal sanction that is not imposed until after the
public expression of the prohibited speech; (2) every instance of a prior restraint
actually will result in the suppression of speech; and (3) every mistake made in
the implementation of a prior restraint will involve the actual suppression of
constitutionally protected speech.
This redefinition of the prior restraint/subsequent sanction distinction
would stabilize the prior restraint doctrine and bring its operation more in line
with the common-sense meanings and expectations generally associated with the
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terms "prior restraint" and "subsequent sanction." This convergence of legal
and ordinary language meanings is critical to the effective operation of the prior
restraint doctrine. It is only through the creation and maintenance of reliance
by potential speakers on the fact that effective legal protections for speech exist,
and actually operate to their benefit, that first amendment doctrines serve to
create an environment in which constitutionally protected expression can thrive.
Though this more literal definition of prior restraint may appear narrower,
and thus less protective of speech, than the current version, it is important to
note that the benefits generated by this proposed redefinition can be realized
without any appreciable cost to current first amendment values. The current
version of the prior restraint doctrine, counterintuitive and unpredictable as it is,
provides little or no protection for potential speakers whose anticipated expres-
sive activity falls outside of the specific case precedents thus far established by
the courts. Given the present lack of a discernible, reasonably predictable defini-
tion of prior restraint in either the decisional pattern or the rhetoric of the
courts, speakers have no reasonable basis upon which to predict whether the
possible suppression of their speech by the government, and the sanctions that
such speakers might bear as a result of challenging such suppression, will be
overturned by a court applying the prior restraint doctrine. In such a climate,
the doctrine is not performing a useful function in defining the domain of consti-
tutionally protected speech under the first amendment.
Moreover, protection against the kind of constitutional abuses that have
been said to accompany laws falling under broader definitions of prior restraint
effectively can be provided by other currently existing constitutional doctrines,
or by the development of more specific doctrines directly disfavoring systems of
administrative preclearance and judicial injunctions that possess one or more of
the disfavored attributes now incorrectly thought to be shared by all such
schemes of legal regulation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, adoption of this proposed redefini-
tion of the prior restraint doctrine will strengthen constitutional protection
against government activity that results in the physical suppression of speech
prior to its public expression. This protection is critical because when speech
that the government attempts to suppress never enters the public domain, the
opportunity for public perception of, and reaction to, the government's speech
suppressive activities is eliminated. This is the most dangerous possible environ-
ment in which government regulation of speech can take place and fully justifies
the maintenance of an independent constitutional doctrine that subjects all such
government action to strict judicial scrutiny.
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